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Abstract: HPAI virus has caused significant economic losses in the poultry industry. Backyard and outdoor poultry 
farms (BOPF) can play an important role in the spread of the disease. A spatio-temporal model has been developed to 
identify areas and periods at higher risk of HPAI spread in BOPF and applied on a Spanish region. Six risk factors 
were considered: Census, density, biosecurity, species susceptibility, proximity to risk wetlands and virus survival. A 
risk map was generated adding each risk factor as a spatial layer and a spatial-temporal analysis was conducted using 
scan statistics. Six clusters of spread risk of HPAI were identified in December and January. Despite the simplicity of 
the model, this system allows to focus the surveillance efforts in the highest risk areas and species. Thereby it could 
improve the efficiency of surveillance and control systems in terms of cost/benefit ratio 
 
Keywords: spatial analysis; avian influenza; risk factors; modelling diseases; multicriteria decision, scan statistics. 
1 Introduction: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus strains have devastating consequences for poultry 
flocks because of their high transmissibility and high mortality rates. In the last years the high spread of the disease has 
caused significant economic losses in the poultry industry. 
Surveillance may be defined as an active and systematic process for early detection and has been recognised by the Chief 
Veterinary Officers (CVOs) as one of the key elements of any animal health policy [1]. A critical component of any 
surveillance system is the cost of the sampling scheme in which disease detection is based. OIE has issued 
recommendations in Terrestrial Animal Health Code [2] and the European Commission has adopted [3] a surveillance 
risk-based approach by targeting the collection of samples to areas at higher risk. This type of surveillance strategy is 
particularly useful in backyard farms whose sampling is resource intensive because there are usually dispersed in small 
farms with small population (fewer than 100 heads).  
Backyard and outdoor poultry farms (BORF) have played an important role in HPAI spreading in Asia [4] but information 
about Europe is controversial. HPAI epidemic in Italy (1999-2000) showed the importance of BORF in the disease 
spreading [5] while a marginal role was described in the Holland HPAI outbreaks [6]. It could be explained by a small size 
population (less likelihood of infected animals) and a marginal trade with the poultry industry. However, due to the low 
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biosecurity and that their contact with wildbirds is more likely, this type of poultry farms could be act as a bridge between 
wild birds and domestic poultry industry, highlighting the importance of applying surveillance in BORF [7].  
Spanish poultry production is ranked third in Europe, and represents an important percentage of the livestock economy in 
the country. Therefore, the spread of HPAI could have a high impact on poultry health and national economy. Only two 
occasional outbreaks (in 2006 and 2009) have been reported in Spain, both were directly or indirectly associated to wild 
birds [8] showing that the spreading risk by BORF (4% of poultry in Spain) is a priority. Moreover, introduction of HPAI 
by migratory birds has been identified as a relevant route in Spain due to this country hosts a large number of migratory 
birds susceptible to HPAI coming from countries with high infection probability [9].  
Spatial analysis is the solution proposed in this paper for the application of risk assessment to identified spread risk areas of 
HPAI in BORF (about which available information is poor) for carrying out of surveillance in a targeted and resource 
efficient way. The study was carried out in Castilla León (CL), which is an autonomous region of Spain, third largest 
producer in poultry in Spain, including 2,538 backyards farms. This region has been considered on previous studies as a 
high risk area for the introduction of HPAI via wildlife birds and live poultry trade [9, 10].  
Spatial analysis models allow the identification of risk zones and periods, making surveillance plans more effective and 
economical. Multicriteria Decision (MCD) combined with spatial analysis has been applied on the study of different 
zoonotic diseases such as Rift Valley Fever, tuberculosis and HPAI [11, 12, 13]. Other spatial tools such as the models of 
time-space scan statistic [14] were used to identify time-space clusters of diseases and have been applied to in many 
livestock diseases [12] such as HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry and wild birds in Europe [15, 16].The aim of this study is to 
identify which areas present a higher risk of the spread of HPAI in BORF in CL using the combination of MCD and time-
space scan statistic analysis. The methodology adopted could be extrapolated to other frameworks in the same country or in 
others. The results obtained would contribute to the improved surveillance and control plans against for HPAI in BORF. 
2 Materials and methods: The spatio-temporal model of HPAI spread risk was developed in two consecutive steps. 
Firstly, a spatial deterministic model was constructed using a MCD method to identify risk areas of spread of HPAI. It was 
based on different risk factors regarding to farms characteristics and environmental parameters. Secondly, a spatio-
temporal analysis was conducted to identify the period and locations at higher risk.  
2.1.Data sources: “Location” (x,y) and “census” data from each of the 2,538 BORP (poultry, ducks, turkey, ostrich, quail, 
partridges, pigeons and pheasants) registered in CL were obtained from Regional government of CL; “Biosecurity” data 
were estimated from expert opinion and “Specie susceptibility” was extrapolated from scientific reports. Environmental 
characteristics, location and surface of wetlands were recorded from Spanish Birdlife (SEO), CORINE [17] and Spanish 
Ministry of Environmental. Monthly mean temperatures (2001-2007) were obtained from Meteorologycal Agency 
(AEmet). 
2.2. Model: 6 risk factors were considered to evaluate the risk of each farm. Farm intrinsic factors were: Census “C”, 
Density “D”, Biosecurity “B” and species Susceptibility “S”. “C” and “D” were estimated applying a surface Kernel model 
using Arc.Gis 9.3. (ESRI ©). “B” and “S” were ranked as showed in Table 1. 
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The extrinsic or environmental spread risk factors included in the model were the proximity of farms to risk wetlands 
(“Rw”) and the survival of virus based on monthly temperature data (“Sm”). “Rw” was identified applying a logistic 
regression model which identify the risk of a wetland associated to wild birds HPAI outbreaks occurrence based on its 
environmental characteristics (salinity, waterbirds and the land use forestry) [18]. “Sm” was evaluated extrapolating 
temperatures data into survival times (“Sm”) by using a HPAI virus survival curve (y=-7.82ln(x) +29.94; R2=0.97) based on 
bibliographical data obtained from EFSA [19]. 
All risk factors were normalized and added to each farm as a variable (D, C, B, S, Rw, Sm), for their inclusion in the model. 
Risk factors were analyzed as spatial layers (ArcGis9.3.) and integrated using the following equation 
RTim=[Rw*Sm]+[D*C*B*S] ; Where Rtim is the risk of spread for each month (m) in each farm (i). Inverse distance 
weighting (IDW) [20] was used to create isopleth maps of the risk of spread of HPAI of each month in CL. 
2.3.Time-spatial statistic: The normal model of the time-space scan statistic [14] was used to identify time-space clusters of 
risk of spread in CL. The null-hypothesis was that the risk is randomly distributed throughout the area and period of time 
under study. Failure to reject the null-hypothesis would be compatible with the application of a random surveillance in the 
farms throughout the region. Conversely, if intrinsic and extrinsic factors are positively clustering then the probability of risk 
of spread  will be aggregated in those periods of times and regions in which those variables and forces are present. For 
cluster identification software builds cylinders and analyzes the significance of risk values inside and outsider. The base and 
the height of the cylinders represented, respectively, the spatial and temporal dimensions of the data. A Monte Carlo process 
implemented through a large number of simulations (n=999) was used to test the significance (P<0.05) of candidate clusters, 
i.e., the confidence that one has in that the candidate cluster represented a true cluster of risk of spread. 
2.4. Sensitivity analysis: The identification of critical risk factors was made by a sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo 
simulation (@Risk 5.5.© software). The resulting regression coefficients showed the relative influence of the each risk 
factor in the model. 
3. Results: 3.1. Monthly model: Areas that showed a highest and constant risk were located in 3 provinces: center of 
Segovia, southern Avila and East center of Leon (Figure 1a). December, January and February were the months that 
showed the maximum values of risk and July and August recorded the minimum values. 
3.2. Time-spatial statistic: 6 significant time–space clusters of risk of spread of HPAI were identified in CL (Figure 1b). The 
area included in the main cluster showed an annual risk mean value higher than the annual maximum values of 66% of the 
regions studied. The cluster radios ranged from 4.87 to 37.51 km (average value=12.30 km) and comprised a surface 
between 74 and 4,421 km2 with an average of 893 km2.The number of farms included in each cluster varied between 24 and 
842. Chicken was the majority specie in all of them over 92% (Table 2).The most significant clusters (1 and 2) had a higher 
diversity of species (Table 2).  
3.3. Sensitivity analysis showed that “C” and “Rw” were the most influential risk factors in the model with 0.65 and 0.54 
regression coefficients respectively. The risk factors “Sm”, “D”, “S” and “B” had a 0.27, 0.09, 0.02 and 0.02 regression 
coefficients respectively.  
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Discussion: The poultry sector is very important in Spanish livestock and so the heavy impact that the spread of HPAI 
could have on health and economy in Spain. According with the EU legislation is recommended to applied risk based 
surveillance such as method for the carrying out of surveillance for avian influenza in a targeted and resource efficient way. 
This paper propose using spatial analysis as solution for developing risk based surveillance in BORF which represents 
fewest percentages of total census of poultry in countries as Spain, but which could have been certain role in the spread of 
the disease in Europe [7].  
The study here identified 6 time-space clusters in which risk of spread of HPAI was higher than that expected by chance. 
The two main clusters were: Cluster 1) in center of Segovia’s province. This area has been identified as the highest risk area 
in all months especially in December. It should be highlight that the mean value of risk in each month in Segovia’s province 
presented higher values than the maximum monthly risk in the provinces of Burgos, Palencia, Salamanca, Soria, Valladolid 
and Zamora. Cluster 2) South Avila’s province is the second area of highest risk. This is an area classified as high risk 
throughout the year, specially between November and March, with a peak in December. It’s significative that both areas 
showed low temperatures, presence of risk wetlands, high density of farms, low biosecurity in its farms and high 
susceptibility species (such as ducks and geese). These results suggest that in a hypothetical situation in case of shortages of 
resources these two areas and periods should be prioritized.  
The agreement of results from the monthly IDW values and cluster analysis supports the conclusion that more spread risk 
exist during the coldest months. All clusters occurred between December and January showed the high time dependence of 
model derivate of the survival virus in the environmental, which is a significant risk factor as suggest Stallknecht et al [21]. 
The census of farms (“C”) and the proximity of risk wetlands (“Rw”) were identified as the most influential factors in spread 
of HPAI in BORF. The significance of “C” as risk factor are consistent with studies elaborated in the HPAI Italian epidemic 
[22]. Proximity of risk wetlands increases the probability of contact to wild bird which is determined as a main risk factor by 
EFSA [19]. Density (“D”) showed lower weight in the model although it is a known risk factor for the spread of infective 
diseases. This result can be explained because BORF were usually dispersed and are not high influenced by commercial 
ruts as the industrial poultry. 
Conclusions: Spread risk model developed is a tool easy to use and useful for veterinary health services as it allows 
identifying areas and periods of greatest risk for the spread of HPAI in BORF. Interestingly, despite the simplicity of the 
model, the system can be easily adjusted focusing surveillance efforts just in those higher risk areas and would help to 
reduce costs efforts. The study presented here is innovative and let’s generate information so far not available which is 
designed to improve animal health and economic efforts in the fight against this disease. The methodology adopted can be 
extrapolated to other frameworks and the developed model can be updated continuously according with the policy and 
structural changes in the sector, to provide current information for answers according with the reality of a country at all 
times.  
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Nomenclature 
HPAI High Pathogenic Avian Influenza  “B”: Biosecurity  “Rw”: Proximity of farms to risk  
BORP  Backyard and Outdoor Poultry Farm “C”: Census of farm  wetlands 
CL Castilla Leon (Spanish region)  “S”: Susceptivility   “Sm”:Survival of virus based on 
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MCD  Multicriteria Decision   “D”: Density  temperature data 
Table 1 The values of the parameters Biosecurity and Susceptibility used in the model. 
Parameter description Level Value  References Normalization 
Backyard farms 1 (Low) 1 
Semi-industrial outdoor 0.66 (Medium) 0.66 
Biosecurity  
Semi-industrial indoor 0.33 (High) 
Expert opinion 
0.33 
Duck and goose: Potential asintomátic host 
shedding virus Susceptible to infection with 
all AI virus strains, but only some HP viruses 
produce clinical disease Quail: Require higher 
levels of testing than for chickens to detect 
infection . Could play a important role in 
HPAI spread 
4 (High) Cardona et al 2008 
Ausvetplan, 2008 
(Pérez et al., 2003a; 
Xu et al., 2007). 
1 
Chicken and turkey. Phaisan Partridge 3 (Médium) Perkins&Swayne, 
2001 
0.75 
Ostriche 2 (Low) (Ausvetplan, 2008) 0.5 
Susceptibility of species 
(This categorization 
assumed (comprised) the 
ability of each species to 
shed viruses and  the 
probability of undetected 
disease) 
Pigeon 1(Very low) (Swayne, 2007),  
 
0.25 
Table 2. Significant clusters of spread risk of HPAI identified in CL by use or normal model of a time-space scan statistics. in a 
period of 5 yerarThe values of the parameters Biosecurity and Susceptibility used in the model.The radius, surface, period of time, 
farms inside, the spread risk inside and outside and the significance of each cluster are indicated in the 7 first rows. A classification 
of farms inside of clusters about species, production system and census are indicated in number and percentaje in the rest of table. 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 
Radius (Km) 12.14 37.51 4.87 5.08 7.78 6.42 
Surface of cluester 463 2343 74 81 190 129 
Period December December January December January December 
Total nº of farms inside cluster 269 842 44 64 24 66 
Mean value of risk inside cluster 0.945 0.665 0.626 0.522 0.598 0.501 
Mean value of risk outside cluster 0.336 0.334 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 
P value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.021 
Duck 3 (1.11) 6 (0.68)     
Turkey 5 (1.85) 6 (0.68)     
Chicken 257 (95.18) 848(96.58) 42 (97.67) 63 (100) 83 (92.22) 62 (92.53) 
Goose 1 (0.37) 5 (0.56)     
Phaisan 1 (0.37) 5 (0.56)   1 (1.11)  
Partridge 3 (1.11) 4 (0.45) 1 (2.32)  2 (2.22) 3 (4.47) 
Pigeon  4 (0.45)   2 (2.22) 1 (1.49) 
Ostrich  1 (0.11)   1 (1.11) 1 (1.49) 
Species: Nº farms (% of 
total) 
 
Quail     1 (1.11)  () 
Indoor 255(94.444) 279(31.77) 1 (2.32) 56 (88.88) 65 (72.22) 15 (22.38) 
Semi-outdoor 16 (5.92) 390(44.42) 12 (27.9) 9 (14.28) 23 (25.55) 51(76.116) 
Production 
system : Nº farms (% of 
total) Outdoor  208(23.69) 31 (72.09)  1 (1.11) 1 (1.49) 
Sume 33.675 10.958 5.304 716 35.455 4.939 Farm census: Nº farms  
(% of total) Mean 125 12 123 11 394 74 
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Fig. 1. (a) Risk of spread of HPAI in CL on January estimated using a MCD spatial method and represented using IDW.(b) 
Significant clusters (red circles) of spread risk of HPAI in CL detected by use of the normal model of the time-space scan statistics. 
The numbers refer to the designation of cluster presented in Table 2.  
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